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I. The Oil Shale Resource: The Green River Formation
A. Formed by deposition in lakes
B. Remarkably uniform bedding
C. High percentage of organic material yields oil on 
destructive distillation, as a consequence of 
chemical/physical conditions of deposition. John Ward 
Smith, "Geochemistry of Oil Shale Genesis in 
Colorado's Piceance Creek Basin" (1974).
D. Areal extent and oil yield potential
1. 2,600 square miles in Colorado, 4,700 square 
miles in Utah, 9,200 square miles in Wyoming.
2. 600 billion barrels, 25 gallons of oil per ton of 
rock; 80 billion barrels recoverable under 
present conditions. Duncan and Swanson, 
"Organic-Rich Shale of the United States and 
World Land Areas", U.S.G.S. Circular 523 (1965).
3. "Multi-mineral" area, depositional center, 
Piceance Creek, Basin, Colorado —  deposits up to 
1,900 feet thick.
II. Early Recognition of the Potential National Importance of
the Oil Shale Resource.
A. Green River Formation was depicted on Hayden's (Dept, 
of Interior) Atlas of Colorado, 1881.
B. Detailed field mapping by U.S.G.S., 1913-1919.
C. Classification in 1916 of most of Green River 
Formation as mineral land, valuable "as a source of 
petroleum and nitrogen," in view of:
1. Dwindling proven oil reserves.
2. Increasing oil demand, price.
3. Examples of commercial shale oil industries in 
Scotland and other countries.
4. Predictable geology.
D. Establishment of Naval Oil Shale Reserves, December 
1916.
E. Government Encouragement of private activity.
1. Annual Reports; statements as to need for shale 
oil; promotional tour of David T. Day of Bureau 
of Mines; preliminary views as to patentability.
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2. Bureau of Mines research.
3. Executive Branch decision in 1916 not to withdraw 
oil shale from mining location, in order to 
provide incentive for private development of 
experimental plants.
F. The Result: A "Boom" in location of oil shale claims,
1916-1920.
G. Inclusion of oil shale in the Mineral Lands Leasing 
Act of 1920.
1. 1918 Legislative Compromise: "Oil Shale" and
"Savings Clause" are added to leasing bills.
2. Congressional awareness that success in 
commercial operations was uncertain.
III. Patenting of Oil Shale Claims, 1920-1930.
A. Instructions of Mav 10. 1920. 47 L.D. 548, occasioned 
by first oil shale patent application to arrive in 
Washington.
B. Acceptance of thin, lean, outcrops or beds for 
discovery.
1. Early patent applications.
2. Freeman v. Summers, 52 L.D. 201 (1927), accepting 
lean, thin exposures for discovery.
C. The first phase of assessment-work-default challenges.
1. Emil Krushnic. 52 L.D. 282 (1927), holding 
automatic forfeiture of oil shale mining claims 
upon any default in performance of annual work in 
view of MLLA of 1920 withdrawal.
2. Wilbur v. Krushnic. 280 U.S. 306 (1930), holding 
that 1872 Mining Law gave U.S. no interest in 
annual work performance and MLLA of 1920 did not 
amend the law, reserving decision on whether 
assertion of a challenge prior to resumption of 
work would make a difference.
D. Reservation of oil shale in Homestead Act patents.
IV. Congressional Review of Oil Shale Patenting, 1930-1931.
A. Attacks in press by Chief of Field Division.
B. Moratorium on issuance of patents.
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C. Senate Hearings, primarily on Freeman v. Summers, 
conducted by Senator Walsh.
D. House Hearings.
E. Resumption of patenting with concurrence of Senate 
Committee; Congressional awareness of lack of present 
marketability.
F. Layman v. Ellis, 52 L.D. 714, (1929) (implying that 
sand and gravel had to satisfy a present marketability 
test to be valuable).
V. Phase II of Assessment Work Challenges, 1930-1935.
A. Instructions, 53 I.D. 131 (1930); Federal Shale Oil 
Co.. 53 I.D. 213 (1930), holding that U.S. could 
invalidate a claim where a challenge was made during 
an assessment-work default. Thousands of oil shale 
claims challenged and declared invalid for defaults.
B. Moratorium on assessment-work contest proceedings 
starting in 1933, upon trial court reversal of 
Virainia-Colorado Development Corn. (53 I.D. 666 
(1932)).
C. Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Coro.. 295 U.S. 
634 (1935), ruling, on question reserved in Wilbur v. 
Krushnic. that the Secretary of the Interior lacked 
authority to challenge oil shale claims for 
nonperformance of annual work, a matter of concern 
only for rival claimants.
VI. Interior's Response to Virginia-Colorado.
A. The Shale Oil Co., 55 I.D. 287 (1935), broadly 
applying Interior's interpretation of 
Virginia-Colorado that its assessment work 
cancellations had been ineffective.
B. Responses to inquiries from Congress, claimowners, and 
their counsel, to the effect that prior assessment 
work cancellations were null and void (1935-1960).
C. Patenting of oil shale claims known to have been 
previously declared invalid for assessment-work 
defaults, 1935-1960.
D. Efforts to obtain legislation requiring that 
assessment work be performed, 1936-1943.
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VII. Interior's Support of Legislation Enacted in 1956 To 
Facilitate Patenting of Oil Shale Claims Where Surface 
Patents Remained Outstanding, Act of July 20, 1956, 70 
Stat. 592, 30 U.S.C. § 122.
VIII. Hamilton v. Ertl, 146 Colo. 80, 360 Pac.2d 660 (1961), 
holding that failure of a co-owner of an oil shale claim 
to pay share of assessment work transferred ownership to 
owners who did the work, pursuant to 1872 Mining Law, 30 
U.S.C. § 28.
IX. Interior Refusal To Patent Oil Shale Claims and Resulting 
Litigation, 1961-1986.
A. Colorado Contest No. 260, initiated in 1961, 
challenging 35 claims in 5 pending patent applications 
on numerous grounds including lack of value.
B. February 1962. Suspension of Contest 260, summary 
rejection of 18 patent applications for 257 claims, on 
basis that pre-1935 assessment work cancellations had 
become final and were effective to nullify the claims.
C. April 17, 1964 decisions.
1. Union Oil Co. of California. 71 I.D. 169 (1964), 
affirming 1962 rejection of certain patent 
applications where no issue existed as to 
adequacy of personal jurisdiction in the 
assessment-work contests, and providing for 
submission of evidence as to personal 
jurisdiction in other contests.
2. Secretarial announcement that all oil shale 
claims would be challenged for lack of value and 
other alleged defects and that major resources 
would be committed to the challenges. Interior 
spends about $100,000,000 by 1986 on the 
challenges.
D. September 1964. Test discovery contests (Colo. Nos. 
359, 360), "Wineqar/Shell" ) initiated, against claims 
never declared invalid for assessment-work default.
E. Oil Shale Corn, v. Udall. 255 F. Supp. 606 (D. Colo. 
1964) (in "Tosco") (denial of motion to dismiss 
complaint seeking review of Union Oil).
F. Supplemental Decision. Union Oil Co. of California, 72 
I.Dv 313 (1965), holding personal jurisdiction partly 
lacking, partly valid, in pre-1935 assessment-work 
contests.
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1 . Additional suits for judicial review filed, U.S. 
District Court for District of Colorado 
( "Bohme" ), "Weber11, "Energy Resources" cases).
2. Suits stayed in 1967 to await final ruling in 
TOSCO.
G. 1966 District Court ruling in TOSCO. 261 F. Supp. 954, 
reversing Union Oil. 71 I.D. 169, on ground that 
Krushnic and Virginia-Colorado had held that Interior 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over assessment 
work.
H. Larson v. Utah, Utah 081587 (B.L.M., June 6, 1967), 
holding that Freeman v. Summers controlled oil shale 
discovery issues.
I. Contest hearing in Winegar/Shell test discovery 
contests, June-November 1967.
J. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968), holding 
building stone mining claim invalid for lack of 
sufficient profitability.
K. Tenth Circuit decision in TOSCO. 406 F.2d 759 (1969), 
upholding District Court reversal of Union Oil. VI 
I.D. 169, for absence of subject matter jurisdiction 
in the assessment-work contests.
L. Hearing Examiner decision in Winegar/Shell test 
discovery contests, following Freeman v. Summers 
(April 17, 1970).
M. Supreme Court decision in TOSCO. 400 U.S. 48 (December 
1970), distinguishing Krushnic and Virginia-Color ado., 
holding that the Secretary had subject matter 
jurisdiction to invalidate claims where there was not 
"substantial compliance" with work requirements 
(discussing both the $100 annual requirement and the 
$500 patenting requirement), and remanding for further 
proceedings, including the bringing of any additional 
charges deemed appropriate).
N. Institution of suits by United States in 1972 to 
invalidiate two oil shale patents as mistakenly 
issued. One suit settled by monetary payment; the 
other decided adversely to the Secretary, in United 
States v. Eaton Shale Co., 433F. Supp. 1256 (D.Colo. 
1977).
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O. 1973 District Court decision in TOSCO on remand from 
Supreme Court ruling that the assessment-work contest 
decisions had been rescinded in 1935, that the United 
States was estopped from asserting their validity, and 
that Interior had adopted a rule that they were null 
and void. 370 F.Supp. 108. Upon joint motion of the 
parties, the Court addressed these issues without a 
remand to Interior for the bringing of additional 
charges.
P. Interior Board of Land Appeals ruling in Winegar/Shell 
test discovery contests, 80 I.D. 370 (1974), reversing 
Freeman v. Summers and holding claims invalid for lack 
of value. Action for judicial review filed in U.S. 
District Court for District of Colorado.
Q. 1975 ruling by Tenth Circuit in TOSCO, vacating 
without reversing District Court's 1973 decision, 
directing remand to Interior for bringing of 
lack-of-discovery and any other available charges, to 
be followed by rulings by District Court on all 
issues, and urging expeditious resolution of the 
patentability of the claims. Claimowners seek but 
fail to obtain Supreme Court review.
R. Tosco patent application cases ("Bohme" contests) 
remanded to Interior in 1977 by District court, which 
retains jurisdiction to expedite further proceedings. 
"Bohme" contests initiated; contest hearing on various 
charges held in 1978.
S. January 1977. District Court discovery decision
reversing IBLA decision in Wineoar/Shell. 426
F. Supp. 1256. Holding that Interior is obliged for 
various reasons to follow Freeman v. Summers.
T. Administrative Law Judge decision in Bohme contests on 
assessment work issues, adverse to claimowners, 
reserving decision on discovery issues to await final 
court ruling in Winegar/Shell actions.
U. 1979 Tenth Circuit decision affirming District Court 
ruling in Winegar/Shell.
V. "Bohme I" ruling by IBLA on "substantial compliance" 
issues, adverse to claimowners in large part, June 
1980, 48 IBLA 267.
W. Supreme Court decision in Winegar/Shell, Andrus v. 
Shell Oil Co.. 446 U.S. 657 (1980), upholding Freeman
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v. Summers and 1920 Instructions as reflecting 
Congressional intent in enacting the MLLA of 1920 and 
in approving patenting in 1930-1931 review, and on 
other grounds.
X. "Bohme II" discovery ruling by IBLA, adverse to 
claimowners on "thin, lean" outcrops, 51 IBLA 97 
(Nov. 5, 1980). Claimowners return to District Court 
seeking reversal of Bohme I and II.
Y. District Court reopens additional actions challenging
Union Oil decisions of 1964 and 1965, and issues 
orders requiring expeditious contest proceedings in 
remaining patent applications, 1980-1982, Interior 
brings array of charges in Weber, Energy Resources, 
and Theo Ertl contests. After contest hearings and 
various decisions by Administrative Law Judges, 
adverse in part to Interior, IBLA holds virtually all 
claims invalid for either or both inadequacy of "thin, 
lean" outcrops for discovery and lack of "substantial 
compliance" with work requirements following Bohme I 
and II: 68 IBLA 37 (1982); 74 IBLA 117 (1983), and
IBLA 85-27 (1986) respectively. Each decision is 
challenged by claimowners in District Court.
Z. May 1, 1985, decision by District Court in Tosco/Bohme 
actions, ruling in favor of claimowners on all issues 
decided adversely to claimowners by IBLA and on 
alternative grounds on all issues, as directed by 1975 
Order of Remand from Tenth Circuit. 611 F.Supp. 1130.
1. District Court orders settlement discussions and 
periodic reports.
2. Government files protective notices of appeal, 
while settlement negotiations proceed, May 1985 
to Spring 1986, in Tosco/Bohme, Weber, Energy 
Resources, and Theo Ertl cases.
3. Parties file periodic status reports to District 
Court and Tenth Circuit on settlement 
negotiations, and defer further litigation.
4. Parties stipulate that Weber, Energy Resources, 
and Theo Ertl cases are not materially different, 
in terms of legal issues and relevant evidence, 
from Bohme cases decided on May 1, 1985. Orders 
of judgment entered in favor of claimowners in 
Weber and Energy Resources, November 1985; 
protective appeals filed.
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5. Claimowners and Interior agree on settlement 
terms, Spring 1986. Interior refers proposed 
agreement to Department of Justice, which reviews 
settlement at several ascending levels, and 
approves the agreement.
X. August 4, 1986, Settlement Agreement.
A. Covers Bohme, Weber. Energy Resources, and Theo Ertl 
actions, 525 oil shale claims, approximately 82,000 
acres, all in Colorado.
B. Claimowners to receive patents, reconvey oil, gas and 
coal to United States.
C. Certain surface use restrictions imposed; water rights
D. Upon issuance of patents, parties to file joint 
motions to remand Bohme, Weber and Energy Resources 
appeals for vacation of District Court's May 1, 1985, 
Tosco/Bohme ruling and related orders in Weber and 
Energy resources, and to dismiss complaint in Theo 
Ertl.
XI. "Aftermath" of Settlement.
A. Internal objections to possible settlement from 
Interior officials in Colorado as settlement 
negotiations proceed.
B. Objections to proposed settlement, circa May-July 
1986, by various means. Press accounts of imminence 
of settlement, late July 1986.
C. Late July 1986 Congressional dispute, in context of 
appropriations for Interior, over settlement, 
patenting.
D. Interior briefings of press, Senate, House on 
settlement, August 5-6, 1986.
E Oversight Hearings by House Committee on 
Insular Affairs, August 12, 1986. Later 
Rep. Rahall, Chairman of Subcommittee on 
Natural Resources,, introduces H.R. 5399, 
shale patenting guidelines materially di 




to impose oil 
fferent from
F. September 11, 1986, hearing and 
5399, substantially amended.
"mark up" on H.R.
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G. September 16 - mid October, 1986. "Continuing 
Resolution", to fund federal government operations as 
of October 1, 1986, provides for 180 day delay in 
implementing August 4, 1986, Settlement Agreement if 
claimowners agree to keep the agreement in effect, and 
180 day moratorium on patenting any other oil shale 
claims.
H. Colorado Administration, National and Colorado 
Wildlife Federations, individual Members of Congress, 
seek to intervene in Bohme, Weber, Energy Resources, 
and Theo Ertl actions to void the Settlement Agreement 
and present issuance of patents, raising FLPMA and 
NEPA issues, September-October, 1986. Tenth Circuit 
rejects intervention, 804 F.2d 590 (Nov. 4, 1986).
I. October-November, 1986. Claimowners decline to agree 
to delay in implementing Settlement Agreement; 
closings begin with exchanges of patents and 
reconveyances of oil, gas and coal.
J. Colorado Administration sues Interior in U.S. District 
Court for District of Columbia, attacking Settlement 
Agreement and patents issued thereunder, on FLPMA and 
NEPA grounds, December 1986. Claimowners file motion 
in U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, 
in Theo Ertl action, to enjoin duplicative litigation 
in the District of Columbia. Colorado Administration 
acts to withdraw motion to intervene in Theo Ertl. 
Interior moves to transfer new action from District of 
Columbia to Colorado. Transfer granted, January 
1987. Colorado moves for preliminary injunction, and 
Interior files to dismiss.
K. 1987. In 100th Congress, Rep. Rahall and others 
introduce H.R. 1039 to amend mining laws respecting 
patenting of oil shale claims. Hearings held,
March 3; amended bill reported to full Committee, 
which reports bill on March 18. Bill forces election 
of lease or permanent unpatented status, in either 
case with significantly increased economic burdens. 
Floor action scheduled for May 28.
In Senate, Sen. Melcher introduces a bill to impose an 
indefinite moratorium on oil shale patenting, to await 
further legislation. No hearings held. Similar 
provision offered as amendment to supplemental 
appropriations bill on Senate floor, May 27, 1987; 
compromise reached, pending patent applications 
excepted; moratorium only until March 31, 1988. 
Legislative hearings promised summer 1987.
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Interior conducts review of remaining unpatented oil 
shale claims, reports to Congress, May 28 and 29.
XII. The Oil Shale Leasing Experience.
A. The 1920 Leasing Regulations, 47 L.D. 424. Issued 
prior to any oil shale patent, and "designed not to 
admit the existence of such a thing as a valid claim 
under the placer laws," according to an April 20,
1920, General Land Office memorandum to the Secretary 
on the first oil shale patent application to reach 
Washington.
B. 1930 withdrawal of oil shale lands from leasing.
C. Interior rejection, 1963-1965, of petitions to amend 
1930 withdrawal so as to permit leasing.
D. Abortive 1968 lease offering; no bids accepted.
E. Prototype Leasing Program, leases issued, 1969-1972.
F. NEPA litigation over leasing, Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1980).
G. Piceance Basin Resource Management Plan, BLM, May 
1987, prepared in order to comply with FLPMA and NEPA.
XIII. Where Do We Stand?
A. If all remaining oil shale claims were patented,
United States would still own 85-90% of oil shale 
acreage and resources, including all of the 
multimineral resource of the center of the Piceance 
Creek Basin in Colorado, up to 1900 feet thick.
B. Commercial production of shale oil requires a very 
large investment in opening a mine, crushing, 
retorting, refining and transportation, probably in 
the order of a billion dollars or more. Land or 
resource values are a minor cost factor. Capital 
investment requires prospects for a stable economic 
and regulatory climate over many years.
C. Patented lands should provide best prospects for 
initial commercial production of shale oil, since no 
lease royalty or rental payments are required.
D. Demonstration of commercial production technology will 
benefit the United States, in terms of its
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proprietorship of 85-90% of the oil shale resource, 
and in terms of reduced dependence or unstable foreign 
sources of petroleum.
E. Could pending legislation prolong uncertainty about 
Governmental policy respecting shale oil development, 
and lead to litigation over constitutionality of 
legislative changes in rights of owners of valid oil 
shale claims?
F. The appropriateness of a reasonable legislative 
deadline to resolve the patentability of remaining oil 
shale claims in accordance with court interpretations 
of the 1872 Mining Law and the Mineral Lands Leasing 
Act of 1920.
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